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Shapiro: Sex-Based Wage Discrimination: One Step Beyond the Equal Pay Act

SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION:
ONE STEP BEYOND THE
EQUAL PAY ACT
Both the Equal Pay Act1 (EPA) and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19642 (Title VII) protect workers against sex-based
wage discrimination. Unfortunately, neither the EPA nor Title VII
has been sufficiently effective in remedying the differential in wage
rates between males and females. 3 The EPA has afforded only lim29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The EPA provides in part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex:
Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of
this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
Id. § 206(d)(1).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
It should be recognized that this Act was designed to redress inequalities betveen men and women workers. Although male employees can bring suits under
both the EPA and Title VII, because most wage discrimination suits involve female
plaintiffs, this Note treats plaintiffs as female. For a situation where male employees
established a prima facie wage-discrimination claim, see Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Neb. v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914
(1976).
3. Statistics from the Department of Labor reveal that on the average, full-time
women workers earn only 60 cents for every dollar earned by men-a percentage no
different from the 1960's when anti-discrimination legislation to combat sex-based
wage differentials was initiated. Compare Norwood & Waldmann, Women in the La1.
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ited protection, for it is applicable only to claims of unequal pay
based on sex for work that is "substantially equal." 4 Consequently,
under the EPA only a portion of the work force is able to challenge

allegedly sex-based salary levels. If there is no employee in a "substantially equal" job to serve as a basis for comparison, the claimant
is left remediless. 5 In addition to the EPA's minimal impact on sexbor Force: Some New Data Series, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 575 (1980) with Remarks of President Kennedy at Signing the
Equal Pay Act on June 10, 1963, 21 CONG. Q. 978 (1964), reprinted in [1963] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687.
It should be noted that the earnings differential is not as great in job categories
associated with higher status and earnings. The great majority of women, however,
are not in these positions. See generally Norwood & Waldmann, supra, at 3 (tables 3

& 4).
Some authors argue that the mere segregation of female workers into certain jobs
has led to a persistent undervaluation of their net worth due to sex discrimination.
See, e.g., Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination,Job Segregation, and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 397, 416-29 (1979), and studies cited
therein. Employment statistics, however, do not support allegations that the entire
wage differential is due to discrimination. Various factors not accounted for in these
surveys are of prime importance in explaining the earnings differential, such as vocational choice, seniority, educational attainment, a women's mobility, and the amount
of overtime worked. See Nelson, Opton, & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the
"Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 233, 239, 250-53
(1980). On the other hand, studies have shown that even after adjustments are made
for these factors, much of the female-male earnings differential remains unexplained.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN

WOMEN AND MEN 2 (1979). These threshold statistics, while not probative of the extent of sex-based wage discrimination in the market, should serve as an impetus for
the legislature and the judiciary to be less conservative in granting plaintiffs the
right to investigate and use remedial measures to address discriminatory wage practices where a sufficient foundation for such a claim is developed.
4. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was the first court to adopt judicially the standard of "substantial equality" as applied to wage-discrimination claims.
See Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265-66 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970). Since then, all other courts are in accord. See, e.g., Coming Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195-96 (1974); Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d
953, 958 (2d Cir. 1977); Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859,
861 (10th Cir. 1976).
For a discussion of the problems of the standard of "substantial equality," see
Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally
Bailey, Statute Notes in Labor Law-the Equal Pay Act of 1963-Problems in
Upholding the Standardfor Female Employees, 5 ST. MARY'S L. J. 409 (1973); Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay Act 1963-70, 39 U.
CIN. L. REv. 615 (1970); Ross & McDermott, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: A Decade
of Enforcement, 16 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 1 (1974); see also Johnson, The
Equal Pay Act of 1963: A PracticalAnalysis, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 570 (1975); Sullivan,
The Equal Pay Act of 1963: Making and Breaking a Prima Facie Case, 31 ARK, L.
REV. 545, 562-63 (1978).
5. Even if the claimant could prove that her salary is excessively low because
of sex discrimination, if a male employee performing "equal" work gets paid equally,
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based wage discrimination due to its inherently narrow coverage,
the EPA has been used by courts to restrict the scope of the expansive and powerful prohibitions on discrimination contained in
Title VII6 when the question of wage-rate discrimination has been
7
raised.
Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . ... 8 The
protections offered by Title VII are not confined to particular disshe has no cause of action under the EPA. The EPA does not address situations
where jobs traditionally filled by women are underpaid by the employer because of
gender considerations. Nor does the statute afford a remedy to plaintiffs who hold
unique positions even in the face of intentional discrimination. See Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, 23 Wage and Hour Cas. 811 (D. Alaska 1978). For problems dealing with comparing professional positions, see Greenfield, From Equal to
Equivalent Pay: Salary Discriminationin Academia, 6 J.L. & EDUc. 41, 46 (1977).
6. The Supreme Court has clearly established that Title VII is to be construed
broadly to effectuate Congress' overriding goal of eradicating invidious employment
discrimination "in whatever form." United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197
(1979). The Court in Weber concluded that Title VII does not prohibit employers
from enacting race-conscious affirmative-action plans to eliminate manifest racial
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories. "Given this legislative history,
we cannot agree with respondent that Congress intended to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress designed Title
VII to achieve." Id. at 204. In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978),
the Court concluded: "It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title
VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without
regard to whether members of the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the work force." Id. at 579. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975), the majority determined that the major purposes of Title VII are "eradicating
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421 (footnote omitted). In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court concluded: "What is required by Congress
is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id. at 431. See generally Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977);
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
7. Many cases adhere to the view that to establish a case of sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII, one must prove a differential in pay based on sex for
performing "substantially equal" work (i.e., the EPA cause of action). See Calage v.
University of Tenn., 544 F.2d 297, 301 (6th Cir. 1976); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc.,
511 F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1975); Ammons v. Zia & Co., 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th
Cir. 1971); Johnson v. University of Bridgeport, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1766, 1770
(D. Conn. 1979); Cullari v. East-West Gateway Coordinating Council, 457 F. Supp.
335, 341 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). For text of statute, see note 2 supra.
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criminatory acts nor does the discrimination need to be based
solely on sexual factors. Employment decisions in which sex is a
factor have been held discriminatory regardless of whether there
are other legitimate nondiscriminatory motivating factors. 9 An exception to this principle is that an employer may hire an individual
on the basis of his or her religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where such classification is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise . -0
"1. A finding that there
were no similarly situated individuals of the opposite sex does not
preclude the possibility of a violation. 1 1
Generally, Title VII has not been interpreted to enable
women to seek judicial relief beyond the substantive parameters of
the EPA except where jurisdictional or statute-of-limitations restrictions would bar relief under the EPA.12 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Gunther v. County of Washington,1 3 a decision recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, 1 4 and
the Tenth and Third Circuits in Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade,

9. Such so-called "sex-plus" discrimination is exemplified in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employer cannot refuse to hire married women
with pre-school aged children unless employer is doing so by refusing to hire all individuals with pre-school aged children).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-2(e)(1) (1976). This exception is not applicable to race,
See generally Sirota, Sex Discrimination:Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1025 (1977). Where an employment practice is challenged as having a discriminatory impact, the defendant's affirmative defense is
referred to as "business necessity." Courts have defined the test as being "whether
there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business." Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See generally Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-ImpactLiability Under
Title VII, 46 U. CIm. L. REv. 911, 916, 918-19 (1979).
11. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971) (unlawful to have "no marriage rule" applicable only to stewardesses (female) where male flight personnel had no such limitation). But see Stroud v.
Delta Air Lines, 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977) (court
found that although unmarried women were favored over married women there was
no discrimination based on sex).
12. See Waters v. Heublin, Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 351 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(court considered EPA claim under Title VII even if it would have been time-barred
under the EPA); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978)
("establishment" requirement of EPA is not limitation on Title VII equal pay claim).
13. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (1981).
14. While this Note was being prepared the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
affirmed Gunther. 101 S.Ct. 2242 (1981).
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Inc. 15 and IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,1 6 have held, however, that a plaintiff is not precluded from bringing a wagediscrimination lawsuit on grounds compatible with Title VII which

do not meet the scope of the EPA. This Note addresses the manner in which these recent decisions reinterpret and clarify the status of plaintiffs' rights in wage-discrimination cases and suggests
guidelines for courts to follow in granting women a forum to challenge wage rates grounded on sex discrimination which do not fit
within an EPA framework.
This Note urges an interpretation of Title VII which creates a
distinct Title VII cause of action for sex-based wage discrimination

and which permits claimants to proceed with objective evidence to
challenge their employer's compensation system. 17 The employer's
own methodology, the job-evaluation plan,' 8 will, in most instances, provide the requisite affirmative proof to establish a prima

facie case under Title VII.1s As with other Title VII lawsuits,

whether the quantum of evidence offered by the claimant estab-

lishes a prima facie case depends on the trier of fact. 20 If, however,
a plaintiff's claim is that she has an "equal" job and is entitled to
equal pay, then the EPA's "substantially equal" test would still be
decisive, regardless of whether Title VII or the EPA is utilized as
the statutory basis for relief. 2 1
15. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
16. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3121 (1981).
17. The theory espoused in this Note is not merely a value comparison between the jobs of various employees. Rather, the claimant will have to demonstrate
that the employer's own methodology for determining wage rates is based on unlawful gender considerations.
To date, courts have rejected the idea of "comparable worth" as a means in and
of itself of establishing a sex-based wage discrimination cause of action. See Lemons
v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244
(1980); Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101
S. Ct. 2242 (1981); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); Gerlach v.
Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 69 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
18. Job evaluation refers to the formal objective procedure for hierarchically ordering a set of jobs with respect to their content and value or worth, usually for the
purpose of compensating employees fairly. See D. TREMAIN, JOB EVALUATION: AN
ANALYTIC REVIEW, INTERIM REPORT 1 (National Academy of Sciences 1979) [hereinafter cited as NAS Report]. For a discussion of job evaluation plans, see text accompanying notes 161-173 infra.
19. See discussion at text accompanying notes 173-196 infra.
20. See text accompanying notes 156-160 infra.
21. The in pari materia doctrine requires such an interpretation. See text accompanying notes 28-32 & 129-131 infra.
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To reach a conclusion that Title VII can and should offer more
extensive substantive protection against sex-based wage discrimination than does the EPA, it is necessary to begin with an analysis of
the purpose and effect of the Bennett Amendment. The ensuing
sections discuss the relevant legislative history of Title VII and the
Bennett Amendment, the language chosen by Congress, administrative guidelines, and the case law. The final section examines
some of the parameters of the plaintiff's cause of action under Title
VII.
TITLE VII AND TE BENNETT AMENDMENT
22
Courts have had trouble construing Title VII (the broader
and more recently enacted statute) with the EPA in the area of
compensation discrimination for a variety of reasons. The largest
impediment to granting more extensive relief than that provided
by the EPA is a provision in Title VII, commonly known as the
Bennett Amendment, which refers to the congruence of the statutes
and provides that "[ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for an employer to differentiate upon
the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such

differentiation is authorized by the [EPA]."2 3 This amendment has

been interpreted in two ways. 24 Under the first interpretation, the
22. Title VII is broader in scope in terms of its language as well as its coverage. See notes 1 & 2 supra for text of both statutes. Title VII has no requirement that
the jobs be performed "within an establishment" as does the EPA. Thus under the
EPA provisions, the A.T. & T. situation, in which jobs performed by women at one
plant were found to be unlawfully undervalued compared to the same positions
filled by men at other Bell System companies (of which A.T. & T. is one), would not
be remedied. For a discussion of the A.T. & T. situation, see Laws, Psychological Dimensions of Labor Force Participationof Women, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE A.T. & T. CASE 129-30 (P. Wallace ed. 1976).
Additionally, Title VII prohibits discrimination in "compensation" as opposed to
the EPA's proscription against discriminatory "wages." "Compensation" and
"wages" are not synonymous. Certain fringe benefits have not been found to be
"wages" under the EPA, yet have been protected from discrimination as it affects a
female employee's take home pay under Title VII. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 800.113 (1979)
(explicitly refusing to decide whether "wages" include pension payments).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added). Named after its proponent,
Senator Bennett, the Bennett Amendment, known also as section 703(h) of Title VII,
has been the authority relied upon for narrowing the scope of Title VII as applied to
wage-discrimination suits. See cases cited note 7 supra.
24. Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 481-82, claims that three possible interpretations of the Bennett Amendment are worthy of consideration. In addition to the two
described in this Note, she asserts that a third interpretation would incorporate both
the "equal work" standard as well as the statutory coverage of the EPA to sex-based
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Bennett Amendment limits plaintiff's compensation-discrimination
claims under Title VII to those which would be cognizable under
the EPA. 25 Under the second, broader interpretation, the Bennett
Amendment incorporates into Title VII the EPA cause of action as
well as the EPA's four affirmative defenses available to an employer. 2 6 Title VII would also afford a worker the opportunity to
challenge other discriminatory compensation practices which do
not involve "substantially equal" work and thus are not actionable
27
under the EPA.
Apart from the Bennett Amendment's reference to the EPA,
courts often feel constrained by the EPA's narrow scope because of
the doctrine of in pari materia.28 This canon of statutory construction is described as follows:
In terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that wherever the
legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter, wherefore it is held that in
the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the
new provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be con29
strued together.
Therefore, under this doctrine, even though Title VII is broader
than the EPA as a form of remedial legislation, because Title VII
and the EPA deal with the same subject matter, Title VII cannot
be applied to sex-based wage-discrimination cases in a manner
wage-discrimination claims under Title VII. Courts, however, have already interpreted Title VII to extend "equal work" protections to cases where the EPA could
not apply due to jurisdictional or time-barred restrictions. See cases cited note 12
supra. Thus, only the two interpretations discussed in this text are plausible.
25. See cases cited note 7 supra. See generally Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d
353, 357 (8th Cir. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring); Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 21
Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. 535, 553-54 (W.D. Va. 1979); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College,
23 Wage and Hour Cas. 319, 328-29 (W.D.N.C. 1976), affd, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
26. Thus, Title VII would provide relief for claimants who prove what would
otherwise be an EPA case, and employers would be able to assert that the wage
disparities are legitimate if they are pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system,
or one that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or any other factor besides sex.
27. See, e.g., IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 631 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 3121 (1981); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624
F.2d 945, 953 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980); Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882,
888-91 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (1981).
28. See authority cited notes 69 & 70 infra.
29. A. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (4th ed. 1973)
(footnote omitted).
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that would have the effect of nullifying the EPA. Additionally,
any construction of Title VII's scope in the area of sex-based wage
discrimination must not contravene the legislative policy of the
EPA.
The EPA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress specifically substituted "equal work" for "comparable work" as the operative standard out of fear that under the aegis of authorized job
comparisons under the EPA, courts and the Department of Labor
would attempt to engage in unnecessary and inequitable reevaluations of an employer's pay structure.30 Thus, a claimant under either the EPA or Title VII will not be able to assert that a
particular job merits equal pay with a "substantially different" and

30. The EPA of 1963 was the product of extensive debates on an equal pay bill
pending during the 87th Congress, Second Session, 1962. The bill originally provided for equal pay for "comparable" work. H.R. 11677, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108
CONG. REc. 14765 (1962). During the debate on the bill, an amendment was accepted which changed the words of the statute to refer to "equal" work rather than
"comparable" work. 108 CONG. REC. 14771 (1962). The remarks of Representative
Landrum depict the general response of Congressmen to this amendment. Representative Landrum noted that utilizing the words "equal work" would prevent "the
trooping around all over the country of employees of the Labor Department harassing business with their various interpretations of the term 'comparable' when
'equal' is capable of the same definition throughout the United States." Id. at 14768.
In 1963, equal-pay legislation was again introduced containing the "equal work"
standard. H.R. 6060, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 9192 (1963). The debates
before Congress again emphasize the limited scope that the EPA was to have. Representative Frelinghuysen, a member of the House Subcommittee on Labor, explained
the use of the words "equal work" as follows:
[W~e can expect that the administration of the equal pay concept, while fair
and effective, will not be excessive nor excessively wide ranging. What we
seek to ensure, where men and women are doing the same job under the
same working conditions that they will receive the same pay. It is not intended that either the Labor Department or individual employees will be
equipped with hunting licenses.
109 CONG. REC. 9196 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen).
Representative Goodell, the sponsor of H.R. 6060, echoed these sentiments,
stating, for the sake of having "a clear legislative history at this point," that the clear
intention is to ensure equal pay for "equal" rather than "comparable" jobs.
We do not expect the Labor Department people to go into an establishment
and attempt to rate jobs that are not equal. We do not want to hear the Department say, "Well, they amount to the same thing," and evaluate them so
they come up to the same skill or point. We expect this to apply only to jobs
that are substantially identical or equal.
109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). For a general background of
the EPA's legislative history, see Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protections Under Title VII, 8 Loy. CM. L.J. 723, 739-42
(1977); Vladeck, The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 18 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 381 (1965).
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higher compensated job based simply on comparisons of job content.31 Title VII's comprehensive anti-discrimination provisions,
however, can be utilized in a manner consistent with the EPA's
legislative policy to redress other forms of sex-based wage discrimi32
nation that the EPA was not designed to remedy.
Legislative History
Although the EPA was not envisioned to be a broad anti-

discrimination statute, the Congress that passed Title VII was
aware that Title VII and its sex provision "constituted a farreaching condemnation of employment discrimination." 3 3 The subject of sex discrimination in employment was not part of the origi34
nal Title VII bill, nor was it covered in any of the hearings.
Arising as an amendment during the end of debate on the House
35
floor, the sex provision was accepted as proposed that same day.
31.

Courts thus far seem to agree that a prima facie case under Title VII is not

established where the claimant simply compares the wages paid to different jobs
without indicating that the differential is due to gender discrimination. See Keyes v.
Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977)
(proof that average pay of male college professors was higher than average pay of females, without more, did not establish prima facie case under Title VII); cf. Smith v.
Union Oil Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 960 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (to establish wage discrimination based on race, plaintiff has burden of showing that different amounts of
compensation are paid to minorities and whites for equal work); Patterson v. Western
Dev. Laboratories, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 772 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (gross comparisons
of average salary received by black officials and managers versus that received by
white officials and managers do not establish a Title VII violation; neither the work
nor the qualifications of these employees was analyzed via regression analysis to determine whether racial factors are significant).
32. See text accompanying, and authority cited, notes 174-196 infra.
33. Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classificationsin
Pension Programs,74 COLUM. L. REv. 1203, 1217 (1974). The prohibition against sex
discrimination was added to Title VII by an amendment proposed by Congressman
Smith of Virginia, whose motive, according to various commentators, was to defeat
Title VII's passage. See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 62, 62 (1964); Miller, Sex Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 880 (1967). Regardless of Representative Smith's motives, the most vocal proponents were the
women representatives on the floor of the House. See, e.g., Comments of Congresswomen Griffiths, Bolton, St. George, May, and Kelly, 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84
(1964). Additionally, the "sex" amendment passed while other amendments that
would have substantially narrowed the strength of the bill failed. See Gitt & Gelb,
supra note 30, at 742-45.
34. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 began as a statute designed to eliminate race
discrimination. See Statements of President Kennedy accompanying the original
Civil Rights bill, 109 CONG. REc. 3245 (1963).
35. 110 CONG. Rxc. 2577 (1964). The amendment was introduced and was
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Since the House approved the entire bill only two days later,3 6 it is
not surprising that the Supreme Court has referred to Title VII's
legislative history as notable "primarily for its brevity."3 7 The legislative history of Title VII is also quite confusing, for neither the
House nor the Senate truly set definitive rules as to how to construe Title VII in light of the EPA.

It was not until the full Senate was confronted with the House
bill for initial consideration that concern was voiced regarding the
recognized area of overlapping jurisdiction between the proposed
Title VII and the EPA, that is, sex-based compensation discrimination. During the debate on the proposed Civil Rights Act, Senator
Dirksen questioned the scope of the proposed bill, specifically
noting that the sex anti-discrimination provisions "extend far beyond the scope and coverage of the Equal Pay Act," without any
provision for the EPA's "equal work" standard.2 8 Senator Clark,
one of the floor managers of the bill, responded that Title VII pro-

vided broader coverage and fewer exemptions than the EPA, but
that the "standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable sit-

uation under title VII." 39

Apparently unsatisfied with Senator Clark's ambiguous explaadopted by a vote of 168 to 133 on February 8, 1964. Id. at 2584. The quick adoption
of the Smith Amendment is said to evince a congressional belief that there were
persuasive reasons for immediate action against sex discrimination, as well as race,
color, and religious discrimination. See Margolin, Equal Pay and Equal Employment Opportunity For Women, 19th N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 297, 305 (1964).
36. Title VII of the Civil Rights bill was passed by a vote of 290 to 130 on February 10, 1964. 110 CONG. REC. 2804 (1964).
37. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976).
38. 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964). See note 47 infra for the memorandum which
was introduced to respond to Senator Dirksen's questions.
39. 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964). Senator Clark introduced this exchange with
Senator Dirksen into the Congressional Record:
Objection: The sex antidiscrimination provisions of the bill duplicate
the coverage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. But more than this, they extend
far beyond the scope and coverage of the Equal Pay Act. They do not include the limitations in that act with respect to equal work on jobs requiring
equal skills in the same establishments, and thus, cut across different jobs.
Answer: The Equal Pay Act is a part of the wage hour law, with different coverage and with numerous exemptions unlike title VII. Furthermore,
under title VII, jobs can no longer be classified as to sex, except where there
is a rational basis for discrimination on the ground of bona fide occupational
qualification. The standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable situation under title VII.
Id. (objection of Sen. Dirksen and answer of Sen. Clark).
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nation regarding possible conflicts between the EPA and Title
VII, 40 Senator Bennett introduced his amendment to section 703(h)
of Title VII, calling it a "technical correction" to provide that "in
the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not
be nullified." 41 During the brief two-minute colloquy preceding
adoption, only two other speakers voiced their comments on the
Bennett Amendment. 42 Senator Humphrey's statement that "[the
40. Before introducing his amendment, Senator Bennett said that he did not
"believe sufficient attention may have been paid to possible conflicts between the
wholesale insertion of the word 'sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act." 110
CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Bennett). The amendment was introduced
during the period of cloture after the floor debate. 110 CoNG. REC. 13647 (1964). See
text of Bennett Amendment at text accompanying note 23 supra.
41. 110 CONG. REc. 13647 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Bennett). The EPA need not
be nullified even if Title VII were construed as affording greater protection to claimants in the area of wage discrimination. When plaintiffs seek to prove discrimination
by comparing jobs, then the EPA standards are applicable. See text accompanying
notes 51-57 & 128-131 infra.
42. The entire history of the Bennett Amendment, prior to its adoption by voice
vote, is set forth below:
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes....
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 44, line 15, immediately after the period, it is proposed to insert
the following new sentence: "It shall not be an unlawful employment practice
under this title for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in
determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions
of section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C.
206(d))."
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of
the fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate
committees of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act,
which became effective only yesterday.
By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration of this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which
the word 'sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the word 'sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act.
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts,
the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified.
I understand that the leadership in charge of the bill have agreed to the
amendment as a proper technical correction of the bill. If they will confirm that
understand [sic], I shall ask that the amendment be voted on without asking for
the yeas and nays.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful. I
believe it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully
acceptable.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield myself one minute.
We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal Pay
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amendment is fully acceptable" 4 3 is of no assistance in deciphering
its meaning and purpose. Senator Dirksen explained that the

amendment was needed to recognize clearly the exceptions contained in the EPA. 4 4 The import of the statements of Senators
Dirksen and Bennett is that the amendment was intended merely

to carry forward the exceptions of the EPA in situations where
both Title VII and the EPA are useful for determining whether the
4 5
claimant has proved sex-based wage discrimination.
While the House later considered the Senate's amendments to

the House bill, Congressman Celler's explanation of the Bennett
Amendment's purpose revealed his belief that Title VII would be
no broader than the EPA in the area of sex-based wage discrimination. In contradiction to Senator Dirksen's clarification, Congress-

man Celler declared that the Bennett Amendment "[p]rovides that
compliance with the (EPA) satisfies the requirements of (Title VII)
barring discrimination because of sex ....-. 46 With only this explaAct was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor
Standards Act carries out certain exceptions.
All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are
carried in the basic act.
Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. RIBICOFF in the chair). The question is
on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Utah. (Putting the question.)
The amendment was agreed to.
110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964).
43. Id. (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). For the entire colloquy, see note 42 supra.
44. Id. (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
45. The courts in both Gunther v. County of Washington and IUE V.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. place great emphasis on the statements made by Senators Bennett and Dirksen during the colloquy which took place when Senator
Bennett introduced his amendment. See IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631
F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3121 (1981); Gunther v.
County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1979), aff d, 101 S. Ct. 2242
(1981).
46. 110 CONG. REC. 15896 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler). While a literal reading of Congressman Celler's statement suggests that Title VII is no broader than the
EPA for any discriminatory practices, the context in which the words were spoken
urges the interpretation that Judge Van Dusen announced in his dissenting opinion
in IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. According to Judge Van Dusen, "the most
logical interpretation of this remark is that complying with the [EPA] would preclude liability under Title VII for all sex-based wage discrimination claims." 631
F.2d at 1113 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting). This interpretation takes into account the
fact that Congressman Celler was explaining the manner in which the two statutes
are to interrelate. Thus, the majority in IUE distorts the meaning of Congressman
Celler's words to be that "compliance with the 'equal work' requirements of the
Equal Pay Act met Title VII's requirements on that issue only." 631 F.2d at 1103.
The Gunther court also gave Congressman Celler's statement cursory treatment and
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nation, the House accepted the Senate bill without modification.
Thus, the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment does little
to clarif, the way Congress intended Title VII and the EPA to interrelate and suggests that both the narrower and the broader constructions of the Bennett Amendment are plausible.
One year after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, Senator
Bennett himself realized the confusion and absence of careful consideration regarding the applicability of Title VII to sex-based
wage-discrimination cases. In an attempted clarification, he introduced into the record a prepared memorandum offering his explanation of the relationship of Title VII to the EPA via the Bennett
Amendment. 47 This memorandum, however, is of little utility in
determining the intent of those who passed the Civil Rights Act.
As post-Act legislative history, it is entitled to minimal signifi48
cance.
failed to recognize the statement's context. See Gunther v. County of Washington,
623 F.2d 1303, 1318 (1980), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981).
47. Senator Bennett's memorandum is as follows:
Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: "It shall not be an
unlawful employment practice under this title for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 6(d) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 206(d))."
The amendment speaks in terms of a "differentiation .

.

. authorized by

the provisions of section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act."
Section 6(d) authorizes two things:
1. Wage differentials as between exempt male and female employees
doing the same work; and
2. Wage differentials on equal jobs made pursuant to (i) a senority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity
or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other
than sex.
The amendment therefore means that it is not an unlawful employment
practice: (a) to differentiate on the basis of sex in determining the compensation of white collar and other employees who are exempt under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act; or (b) to have different standards of
compensation for nonexempt employees, where such differentiation is not
prohibited by the equal pay amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Simply stated, the amendment means that discrimination in compensation on account of sex does not violate Title VII unless it also violates the
Equal Pay Act.
111 CONG. REC. 13359 (1965).
48. See Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water, 553 F.2d 581, 589 (9th
Cir. 1976), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), and
cases cited therein (discussion occurring after passage of Bennett Amendment has little significance as not necessarily representing congressional intent).
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The Bennett Amendment-Its Language and

Utility as Part of Title VII
The statutory language of the Bennett Amendment does not
support the view that the scope of the EPA and Title VII are iden-

tical in the area of compensation discrimination but merely indicates that Title VII will not bar wage differentials "authorized" or

permitted by the EPA.4 9 The EPA applies only when a claimant
has been denied equal pay for "equal" work, and if the employer
can prove that the wage differentiation is due to one of the EPA's
affirmative defenses, then it is "authorized." Conversely, where
there is no work of substantially similar job content ("substantially

equal"), the EPA is inapplicable-those wage differentials are not
necessarily "authorized;" they are unaddressed. 50

Read alongside the legislative history of Title VII these words
disclose a congressional intent to avoid subjecting employers to two

conflicting standards, those of Title VII and those of the EPA, and
to provide that any possible conflict between the regulations of the
two statutes should be resolved in favor of the EPA. 5 1 In other

words, the Bennett Amendment's function is to harmonize de52
fenses to practices prohibited mutually by the EPA and Title VII.
49. See text of the Bennett Amendment at text accompanying note 23 supra.
This interpretation was adopted by the majority in IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3121 (1981). The majority uses
the common meaning of the word "authorized" to describe a thing that is endorsed
or expressly permitted rather than something which is permitted to be done in the
future. Id. at 1100-01. As Judge Van Dusen points out in his dissenting opinion,
however, the common meaning of the word is not clear enough to reveal conclusively the correct interpretation of the Bennett Amendment. Id. at 1111 (Van Dusen,
J., dissenting).
50. See Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 69, 78-79
(E.D. Mich. 1980); cf. Angelo v. Bacharach Instr. Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1173 (3d Cir.
1977) (EPA comprehends threshold requirement evident in legislative history and
confirmed in case law that jobs to be equated be substantially the same).
51. See E.E.O.C. v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631, 634-35 (D. Me. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978). The district court relied upon
Senator Bennett's declaration that the purpose of his amendment is to provide that in
the event of conflicts between the two statutes, the provisions of the EPA should not
be nullified. 439 F. Supp. at 635 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 13646 [sic] (1964) (remarks
of Sen. Bennett) (reprinted at note 42 supra)).
The Supreme Court has noted that "[b]ecause of this [Bennett] amendment, interpretations of § 6(d) of the Equal Pay Act are applicable to Title VII as well ......
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144 (1976).
52. See Kahn, Comparable Worth: Journey of a Thousand Miles, 3 CoRnP. L.
REv. 136, 139 (1980). Congress extensively debated the meanings of the EPA's affirmative defenses prior to the enactment of the EPA. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 309,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
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Opponents of this interpretation contend that the Bennett Amendment can be given substantive meaning only by holding that it incorporates something more into Title VII than the four affirmative
defenses of the EPA. 53 Since the first sentence of Title VII's section 703(h) already contained three of the four EPA defenses (seniority, merit system, or a system that measures earning by quan-

687, 689; 109 CONG. REC. 9203 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Fountain) (need to clarify
what is meant by word "system" in "seniority system"); 109 CONG. REC. 9761 (1963)
(remarks of Sen. McNamara) (burdens of proof discussed).
The Bennett Amendment may have been unnecessary because of the doctrine of
in pari materia. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra for a discussion of the doctrine's meaning. In Title VII Congress did not expressly repeal the EPA's "equal
work" requirement for cases alleging claims similar to those the EPA was designed
to address. Furthermore, repeals by implication are not favored and must meet certain requisites which are not present in this instance. See Radzanower v. Touche,
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976), for a discussion of repeals by implication.
Since the doctrine of in pari materia is applicable, the EPA's standards could not be
discarded.
Nonetheless, both statutes can still operate as viable forms of relief from sex discrimination in a manner whereby the EPA would not be nullified and Title VII
could provide for a broader range of the kinds of cases involving sex-based wage discrimination which could be addressed. See text accompanying notes 173-196 infra
for examples of the types of cases that Title VII could cover.
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 431, 449
(1966), claims that Title VII would have been interpreted to incorporate only the
EPA's defenses without the Bennett Amendment, but the presence of the amendment makes such construction clear.
53. See Brief as Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council at
24, Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 244 (1980); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 3, at 271.
The full text of section 703(h) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976)) shows the context
in which the Bennett Amendment appears:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees
who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminatebecause of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapterfor any employer to differentiate upon
the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation
paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is
authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added).
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tity or quality of production) when the Bennett Amendment was
proposed, and the fourth EPA defense ("a factor other than sex") is
implicit in the very definition of Title VII's prohibition of discrimination based on sex.5 4 Although the words of the Bennett Amendment of section 703(h) appear redundant, however, the amendment serves as a guarantee that the EPA and the meaning and
legislative history regarding its affirmative defenses will not be
nullified. 5 5 Furthermore, the Bennett Amendment's location as' the
third sentence in section 703(h) provides a clue to the appropriate
meaning to be accorded to these words. The other two provisions
of the same section have been interpreted by the Supreme Court
and are treated as affirmative defenses to be established by the employer. 5 6 Thus, the argument that the Bennett Amendment narrows
the potential scope of Title VII in the compensation-discrimination
area loses its strength especially when one considers that it was to
be a mere "technical correction" 5 7 to the Civil Rights Bill. More
plausible is the notion that the Bennett Amendment incorporates
the EPA's affirmative defenses into Title VII where an EPA-type
claim is alleged.
The location of the Bennett Amendment is important for another reason. The first sentence of section 703(h) declares that
"notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter" no inten54. See full text of section 703(h) at note 53 supra.
55. When EPA-type causes of action are brought under Title VII, the Bennett
Amendment forces the plaintiff to focus on EPA standards. As for the redundancy in
the statute, it should be pointed out that the anti-discrimination provisions of Title
VII are also unnecessarily repetitive. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976), which
deals with a subset of the conditions in 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a)(1) (1976). (Text of statute is at note 2 supra).
The EPA still remains a viable remedy for a plaintiff and, for strategic reasons,
will probably be invoked if its prerequisites can be met. For instance, the EPA often
permits an award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to double the amount of
backpay, whereas Title VII has no such provision. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) & 260
(1976 & Supp. III 1979). Furthermore, the period for recovery of back-pay awards is
longer under the EPA than under Title VII. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2 16(c) (1976 &
Supp. III 1979) (three years prior to suit) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) (two
years prior to the date charges are filed with the EEOC). Lastly, EPA claimants can
proceed directly to court, whereas Title VII plaintiffs must first resort to administrative remedies. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (plaintiff can file
suit in court immediately) with 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-5(f)(1) (1976) (plaintiff must file a
complaint with EEOC within 180 days and receive EEOC "right to sue letter" prior
to filing suit in federal court). See generally Sullivan, supra note 4, at 54647.
56. See Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 484 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (senority); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975) (testing); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (testing)).
57. See 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Bennett).
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tionally discriminatory practice shall be permitted by Title VII. 58
An interpretation of the Bennett Amendment that implies that no
compensation-discrimination lawsuits can be brought under Title
VII unless they are simultaneously violative of the EPA would condone explicitly prohibited intentional discrimination in compensa-

tion and would be offensive to the plain meaning and purpose of
Title VII. 59 It is unlikely that the Congress that enacted the

Bennett Amendment would have desired the EPA to thwart its
goals against employment discrimination, since the composition of
the Congress that enacted Title VII was identical to the Congress
that enacted the EPA. 60 It follows that the Bennett Amendment
cannot legalize intentionally discriminatory practices, and Title VII

cannot be limited to sex-based wage-discrimination claims that
would be actionable under the EPA.
Administrative Interpretations
The guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the regulatory body responsible for enforcing
Title VII's equal employment provisions, 6 1 are of limited use in interpreting the Bennett Amendment and the EPA's relation to Title
VII. Because the EEOC has offered conflicting interpretations in

its guidelines and decisions on wage-discrimination claims, the deference traditionally accorded to EEOC guidelines 6 2 should be relaxed.
58.

See note 53 supra for text of § 703(h) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)

(1976)).
59. See authority cited note 6 supra.
60. The EPA was adopted in the First Session of the 88th Congress on May 28,
1963. See 109 CONG. REC. 9762 (1963). Title VII was passed by the Second Session
of the 88th Congress on July 2, 1964. See 110 CONG. REc. 15897 (1964).
61. The Civil Rights Act created the EEOC to enforce the statute's equal employment provisions, but failed to give EEOC formal rule-making powers. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4(a) to (g) (1976). This Act was amended in 1978 to provide for stronger enforcement powers. Reorg. Plan. No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807 (1978), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp. III 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978). The interpretations promulgated by the EEOC have nonethelesi been given considerable weight
by the judiciary. See note 62 infra for a discussion of judicial treatment of agency
regulations.
62. According to the Supreme Court, guidelines promulgated by the agency
primarily responsible for enforcement, while not binding, are to be given significant
weight unless disregarding them is "justified by very good reasons." Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944). The presumption is that these regulations are valid unless shown to be erroneously in conflict with earlier guidelines on the same topic or with the Act itself.
See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (less weight accorded to guidelines not issued contemporaneously with Act and to guidelines that
contradict agency's position enunciated earlier).
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In 1965, the EEOC promulgated its initial interpretation of

the interrelationship between Title VII and the EPA. The 1965
regulations stated that "the Commission interprets section 703(h)
[the Bennett Amendment] to mean that the standards of 'equal pay
for equal work' set forth in the Equal Pay Act for determining what
is unlawful discrimination in compensation are applicable to Title
VII."63

Contrary to what appears a simple reading of these EEOC
regulations, various EEOC decisions under these regulations reject

an interpretation of the Bennett Amendment which refuses to extend Title VII coverage to compensation-discrimination claims
which are not cognizable under the EPA. 64 In 1972, the EEOC issued a revised guideline which provides that "[b]y virtue of the
[Bennett Amendment], a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may
be raised in a proceeding under Title VII." 65 This guideline refers
Thus, in GeneralElectric Company, the Supreme Court refused to follow EEOC
guidelines on the pregnancy-disability issue because the latest guidelines were held
inconsistent with earlier ones. Id. at 141-42.
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1966). This guideline provides as follows:
(a) Title VII requires that its provisions be harmonized with the Equal Pay
Act (section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 206(d))
in order to avoid conflicting interpretations or requirements with respect to
situations to which both statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the Commission interprets section 703(h) to mean that the standards of equal pay for
equal work set forth in the Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful
discrimination in compensation are applicable to Title VII. However, it is
the judgment of the Commission that the employee coverage of the prohibition against discrimination in compensation because of sex is co-extensive
with that of the other prohibitions in section 703, and is not limited by section 703(h) to those employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
64. See EEOC Dec. No. 71-2629 (June 25, 1971), in [1973] EEOC DEC. 6300,
at 4536, 4538-39 (where wage rates are adjusted upward from base wage and markedly disproportionate share of system's benefits are received by those jobs from
which until recently females were excluded, employer is guilty of discrimination;
and, since situation is not encompassed by the EPA because "equal work" is not involved, it cannot be "authorized" by that Act within the meaning of the Bennett
Amendment); EEOC Dec. No. 70-695 (April 13, 1970), in [1973] EEOC DEC. 6148,
at 4253 (employer unlawfully discriminated against female employees by classifying
employees by sex in calculating wage rates and paying women excessively low
wages); EEOC Dec. No. 70-112 (Sept. 5, 1969), in [1973] EEOC DEC.
6108, at
4159 (same holding as above).
65. The full text of the guidelines provides:
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimination based
on sex contained in Title VII is coextensive with that of the other prohibitions contained in Title VII and is not limited by section 703(h) to those employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
(b) By virtue of section 703(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may
be raised in a proceeding under Title VII.
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only to the EPA's affirmative defenses and deletes the "equal
work" formulation.6 6 Whether the EPA's substantive criteria need

ever determine wage-discrimination claims under Title VII is an is-

sue the Commission chose not to discuss. 67 Since these current
guidelines appear inconsistent with those in effect earlier, the
EEOC guidelines are of minimal utility in determining the scope
68
of wage-discrimination claims.
TITLE

VII,

THE

THE BENNETT AMENDMENT,

EPA,

AND THE COURTS

Although the Bennett Amendment represents congressional
recognition of a need to strike an appropriate relationship between
Title VII and the EPA, because of overlap in the coverage of the
two statutes, courts have inadequately analyzed and applied the
principles and policies that breathe life into the statutes. While the
courts have adopted the rules that the statutes should be read in
pari materia6 9 and should be construed in harmony, 70 they have
failed to harmonize the two. 7 1 With regularity, courts have applied
(c) Where such defense is raised the Commission will give appropriate consideration to the interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor, but will not be bound thereby.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1979).
66. Id.
67. See Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 69, 78-79
(E.D. Mich. 1980). The court in Gerlach stated: "The new guideline does not appear
expressly to adopt the equal work formula, but neither does it expressly reject that

formula." Id.
68.

See discussion in note 62 supra.

69. See, e.g., DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir.
1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Ammons v. Zia & Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119 (10th Cir.
1971); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 260 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970); Johnson v. University of Bridgeport, 20 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 1766,
1769 (D. Conn. 1979).
70. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 446 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511
F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Hodgson v.
Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 463 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass
Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970); Pedreyra v.
Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936, 944 (D. Colo. 1979); Taylor
v. Weaver Oil & Gas Corp., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 23, 29 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
71. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 475-90; Gitt & Gelb, supra note
30, at 751-59. Both agree with Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discriminationin American Law
III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 305, 344-46 (1968), who describes the various public-policy rationales for
not limiting Title VII's compensation provisions solely to those addressed by the
EPA. Kanowitz states:
It is difficult to believe that the specific legislative history of the Equal Pay
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the "equal-work" standard as a substantive limitation upon wage73
discrimination claims under Title VII. 71 To see how Gunther,
Fitzgerald,74 and UE75 clarified the function of the Bennett
Amendment and the scope of Title VII vis-h-vis the EPA, it is necessary to examine the rationale of earlier cases that have construed
Title VII in such a constricted manner.
The Wheaton Glass Decision and the Bennett Amendment
The concept of treating Title VII and the EPA in pari materia
arose in an EPA case that discussed the interrelationship between
the two statutes. In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 7 6 the Third Cir-

cuit utilized the policies underlying Title VII to render a judicial
construction of the EPA that, for the first time, permitted courts to
scrutinize work performed in different sex-based job classifications
to determine whether differences in work were substantial (i.e.,
the "substantially equal" test). According to the defendant,
Wheaton Glass Company, the job classifications of female selectorpacker and male selector-packer denoted separate jobs involving
different tasks. The employer alleged that the ten percent higher
wages received by the male selector-packers were justified since
these men performed extra tasks and were flexible in their work assignments.7 7 The court, however, found that the jobs had only minor distinctions in the work performed and deserved equal pay. 78
The flexibility factor was present in both male and female selectorpacker jobs and there was no proof adduced that the so-called extra
tasks were performed by all of the men or that these tasks took up
a significant amount of time. 79
In deciding that the employer violated the EPA, the Third
Act can be used to interpret the meaning of difficult provisions in Title
VII-especially since the one reference in Title VII to the Equal Pay Act, if
interpreted mechanically, may lead to results that are destructive of Title
VII's basic promise of equal employment opportunity for women workers.
Id. at 344 n.161.

72. See, e.g., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 230 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 244 (1980); Marshall v. Dallas Independent School
Dist., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 143 (5th Cir. 1979); Calage v. University of Tenn.,
400 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1977).
73. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101
S. Ct. 2242 (1981).
74. Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).

75. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied,
76.
77.
78.
79.

101 S. Ct. 3121 (1981).
421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 262-63.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss5/9

20

Shapiro: Sex-Based Wage Discrimination: One Step Beyond the Equal Pay Act
SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION

Circuit acknowledged that, generally, differences in job classifications were thought to be beyond the coverage of the EPA. 80 The
court was aware, however, that if this view were followed as a cardinal rule, a gap in the EPA would be created. Employers would
give different job titles to "substantially equal" jobs and pay the females lower wages. 81 Relying on Title VII's prohibition against discrimination of employees because of sex in job classification, the

court stated that both statutes are in pari materia in the area of sex
discrimination. 82 The court then declared that neither the EPA nor
Title VII permits artificial classification plans to prevent inquiry as
to whether there exists an equal-pay violation.8 3 Taking note of the
Bennett Amendment, the Third Circuit justified its extension of
the EPA's remedial powers to provide redress for EPA claimants in
"substantially equal" work, intimating that any other construction
would undermine the Civil Rights Act. 84 Thus, the Third Circuit
actually utilized the policy underlying Title VII's anti-discrimination provisions to broaden the types of cases the EPA could
address.
Although the court specifically declined to "delineate the precise manner in which these two statutes must be harmonized to
work together in service of the underlying Congressional objective,"8 5 the opinion cites an Article by Professor Kanowitz s6 who
strongly believes that "section 703(h) 'merely incorporates by reference into Title VII the enumerated defenses set forth in the Fair
Labor Standards Act . . . together with such interpretative rulings
thereon . ... ' "87 Unfortunately, other courts that cite Wheaton

Glass as precedent for the appropriate way to construe Title VII
with the EPA have disregarded the Third Circuit's treatment of the
Bennett Amendment and the reference to Kanowitz. Instead of
permitting Title VII's anti-discrimination policy to broaden the
EPA's scope, these courts have interpreted Wheaton Glass as
enabling the EPA to constrict Title VII.
80. Id. at 265.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 266.
83. Id. at 265-66.
84. Id. at 266. In discussing the Bennett Amendment's purpose and the policies
of Title VII, the court of appeals recognized that "[s]ince both statutes serve the
same fundamental purpose against discrimination based on sex, the Equal Pay Act
may not be construed in a manner which by virtue of § 703(h) would undermine the
Civil Rights Act." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at n.15.
87. Kanowitz, supra note 71, at 346 (quoting Opinion Letter, October 12,
1965, CCH EMPL. PRAcT. GUIDE 17,252.09 (1966)).
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Cases Subsequent to Wheaton
In another EPA decision, the Fifth Circuit in Hodgson v.
Brookhaven General Hospital88 agreed with the Wheaton Glass
court that the purpose of Title VII and the EPA should be harmoiized, yet misinterpreted Wheaton Glass as suggesting that equal
pay is required for sexually classified jobs which are in fact substantially different in job content if the reservation of the higher-paying
jobs for men would be prohibited by Title VII.89 The court then
rejected the idea of automatically granting equal pay to such persons because permitting a recovery of the total wage differential
between different jobs would be unjust if. greater effort is required
in the higher-paying jobs and/or most women would not have
sought employment in these jobs. 90
Even though the Wheaton Glass construction of the application of both statutes does not extend as far as the Fifth Circuit's
Hodgson decision contended, 91 subsequent cases have relied on
this erroneous interpretation of Wheaton Glass to limit the availability of Title VII to address sex-based wage-discrimination claims
that are not unlawful under the EPA. For instance, in Wetzel v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,92 the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
that without regard to whether the two jobs at issue were "equal,"
Liberty Mutual violated Title VII by segregating its work force and
considering the sex of its employees in establishing the compensation of the claims-representative position (female) at a lower rate
than that of the claims adjuster (male).93 The Pennsylvania court
reiterated the fears of the Hodgson court, claiming that:
An employer who violates Title VII by segregating job classifications by sex is not liable for the entire difference between the
wages for the higher paid male jobs and the lower paid female

88. 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).
89. Id. at 727. The court observed: "At least one federal court of appeals has
suggested that equal pay should be required for a 'male' job and a 'female' job which
are in fact unequal if the reservation of the higher paid jobs to males would be impermissible under Title VII." Id.
90. Id.
91. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 609. The Brookhaven court incorrectly analyzed the Wheaton Glass decision. Wheaton Glass involved jobs which were found
to be "substantially equal" ,and therefore within the ambit of the EPA. The Wheaton
Glass court was concerned with real differences in job content. 421 F.2d at 264-66.
92. 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
93. Id. at 399-400.
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jobs to each female who was thus denied a job opportunity unless the two jobs being compared were substantially equal in
skill, effort and responsibility. These courts have held that only
those women who can show that they have been denied their
"rightful place" in a higher-paying position or a promotion will
94
be entitled to this amount of damages.
Even though the two jobs involved "substantially equal" work and
the pay differential thus constituted a Title VII violation, 9 5 the
Wetzel court concluded that "this portion of Title VII incorporates
the requirement of the Equal Pay Act that a plaintiff who was
hired for a lower-paying job must prove that she did work equal in
skill, effort and responsibility to that performed by men in higher
paying jobs .... "96
The first extension of the EPA into the seemingly sole remedy for sex-based wage discrimination occurred shortly after the
Wheaton Glass decision was rendered. In Ammons v. Zia & Co. 97
the Tenth Circuit adopted the language of the Wheaton Glass court
as the foundation for its determination that plaintiffs seeking to
prove a sex-based compensation violation under Title VII have the
burden of proving both that the differential in pay is based solely
on sex and that the jobs performed are equal.9 8 The plaintiff's complaint relating to her salary was that she was paid less than three of
the other workers in the plant for performing the same work. 99
Since she failed to show that she was paid less than others performing "substantially equal work," the court found she did not
meet her burden of proof under Title VII. 10 0 In reality, however,
Ammons was merely an EPA case brought under Title VII, and the
94. Id. at 400 (emphasis added). The court, however, failed to discuss whether
the employer could be liable for part of the wage differential under Title VII.
95. Id. at 407.
96. Id. at 400-01.
97. 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
98. Id. at 119-20. The Tenth Circuit has subsequently decided two major cases
dealing with Title VII, the EPA, and the Bennett Amendment. Fitzgerald v. Sirloin
Stockade Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs can establish Title VII claim
of sex-based wage discrimination where claim does not conflict with EPA); Lemons
v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 244
(1980) (theory that market rate historically results in higher wages for maledominated jobs, and thus that employer should not be able to base compensation
system on prevailing wage rates, does not state Title VII claim).
99. 448 F.2d at 118. In addition to the wage claim, the plaintiff failed to prove
that she was ultimately discharged because of her sex.
100. Id. at 120-21.
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plaintiff would not have carried her burden in either cause of action. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit neglected to discuss either the
legislative history or the purpose of the Bennett Amendment. Thus,
as in Wheaton Glass, the court in Ammons did not conclusively delineate the manner by which both statutes should be harmonized.
The Bennett Amendment was actually transformed into a limitation on Title VII's ability to remedy sex-based wage discrimination by the Fifth Circuit in Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son,
Inc. 10 1 In that case, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court decision that granted relief to a female employee who claimed sex
discrimination in compensation in jobs which were dissimilar but
where there was intentional discrimination by the employer.102
While the plaintiff failed to prove that the jobs at issue were identical, she was able to show that they were similar and that the vice
president of the company, who had fixed her salary, had stated to
another person that he would not pay her as much as a man. 10 3
Citing Wheaton Glass, the district court concluded "that the jobs
in this case are not as 'substantially equal' as the ones in other
cases where recovery has been permitted; however, to deny plaintiff recovery because of the dissimilarities when such blatant discrimination exists, would be to restrict Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act by the Equal Pay Act-a construction surely not intended by
10 4
Congress or approved by the Courts."
The court of appeals reversed the holding of the district court
on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to show that the
jobs were "substantially equal." Citing the EPA, the language of
the Bennett Amendment, Ammons, Hodgson, and Wheaton Glass,
the Fifth Circuit held that Title VII must be construed in harmony
with the EPA and that the best way to accomplish this is to require
plaintiffs to meet the substantive "equal work" test of the EPA in
order to prove a wage-discrimination claim under Title VII. 0 5

101. 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
102. 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), rev'g 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. 694, 696-97 (S.D.
Fla. 1973).
103. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. at 696.

104. Id. at 696-97.
105. 511 F.2d at 170-71. The court concluded: "To establish a case under Title
VII, it must be proved that a wage differential was based upon sex and that there
was the performance of equal work for unequal compensation." Id. at 171. For persuasive evidence that the Fifth Circuit would now find a Title VII wage-discrimination violation on some other basis than that encompassed by the EPA, see cases
cited note 109 infra.
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These early decisions of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits restricted
Title VII's prohibition against sex-based compensation discrimination to the scope of the EPA without properly analyzing either the
broader policy issues at stake, the possible scope of Title VII, or
the significance of the Bennett Amendment. Instead of construing
the EPA and Title VII in a manner whereby they would not under-

mine one another, the opposite has occurred, with courts improperly using Wheaton Glass to narrow Title VII rather than broaden
the EPA.
From Orr to Gunther: "Equal Work"
Applied Automatically-But Why?
Subsequent to Orr, most cases dealing with wage-dis-

crimination claims brought under Title VII involved plaintiffs
whose theory of liability assumed that "equal work" was a necessary part of their claim. 10 6 In the context of these proceedings,
courts properly relied on Ammons and applied the EPA
standards. 10 7 These courts were never faced with the necessity of

deciding whether "equal work" was a necessary part of a Title VII
plaintiff's case. In other cases, where the plaintiffs tried to use Title VII to bring a wage-discrimination claim, the facts and circum-

stances suggested that the plaintiff would not have been able to es08
1
tablish a prima facie case under either Title VII or the EPA.

106.

See, e.g., Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183, 184-86 (7th

Cir. 1979); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Erickson v. Lustra Lighting Div. of I.T. & T., 12
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 372, 376 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
107. This would be the best way to harmonize the two statutes since both overlap in these circumstances. As noted in Gunther, "any other approach may have produced different results depending on whether a plaintiff labeled his cause of action
as being brought under 'Title VII' or under the 'Equal Pay Act."' Gunther v. County
of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981).
108. In those cases where claimants challenged the standards used by the
court, no adequate foundation was laid to establish that the wage rate was due to
gender discrimination. In Lemons v. City & County of Denver, for example, the
plaintiffs sought to prove that the City of Denver discriminated against its nurses because, rather than compare the "value" of these positions as calculated on a job evaluation plan to other positions in the city's labor force, the City of Denver internally
evaluated these jobs and then paid these positions the prevailing wage in the community. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906, 908-10 (D. Colo. 1978). The market rate, they
argued, historically results in higher wages to male-dominated jobs than to femaledominated jobs even where, as in this case, the organization's internal job evaluation
suggests otherwise. Id. As the Colorado District Court noted, "[tihe entire theory of
the plaintiffs' case is that the [city] does not discriminate among its own employees,
but rather that there is occupational discrimination which has come down through
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The courts in these cases relied on precedent declaring that Title
VII compensation lawsuits required the "equal work" standards.
Yet there was no reason to upset the holdings of the prior cases.
Only Gunther, Fitzgerald, and IUE contained sufficient evidence
of employer discrimination to persuade the courts to reevaluate the
way EPA and Title VII9 should interrelate in sex-based wage10
discrimination lawsuits.

Importing the EPA's substantive restrictions into Title VII
denies plaintiffs a forum to challenge rate structures which, they
might otherwise be able to demonstrate, reduce their compensation solely due to their sex. 110 Such a construction of Title VII appears antagonistic to the congressional mandate to rid the employment environment of discrimination."1 Even cases that accept the
premise that, by the terms of the Bennett Amendment, salary
disparities that do not violate the EPA are not proscribed by Title
VII hesitate to apply this harsh analysis to deprive a plaintiff of a
remedy under analogous remedial legislation. 112 Since the Bennett
the centuries and that Congress intended that the courts should take over the
restructuring of the economy of the United States of America." Id. at 908.
Determining that the City of Denver acted in good faith, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals declared that under existing authority, courts cannot require an employer to
reassess the worth of services in each position in relation to all others and to strike a
new balance and relationship in total disregard of community conditions. 620 F.2d
228, 229 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980); accord, Christensen v. Iowa,
563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) (theory espoused by plaintiffs ignores economic realities because value of job to employer is only one factor affecting wages); see cases
cited notes 17 & 31 supra.
109. There were, however, some cases prior to these three recent decisions
which, in dicta, state that the Bennett Amendment only incorporates the defenses
found in the EPA into Title VII. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712 (1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567
F.2d 429, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
Since the Gunther decision, other courts have agreed with the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the Bennett Amendment-that it brings in the four affirmative defenses and EPA theory only where both statutes are applicable. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 607, 611 n.5 (4th Cir. 1980); Burdine v.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 569 n.14 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 447 U.S. 920 (1980); ef. Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 24 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 69, 83 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("Bennett Amendment should be read consistently with the balance of Section 703(h) and held inapplicable to discrimination in
compensation that is the result of an intention to discriminate on the basis of sex").
110. Utilizing current employer practices, a plaintiff may be able to demonstrate the extent of unlawful wage disparities without having to second guess an appropriate compensation rate as a remedy. See authority cited note 178 infra.
111. See cases cited note 6 supra.
112. In Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977), for instance, the plaintiff attempted to use salaries in comparable jobs in other hospitals to
substantiate that she was discriminatorily paid less than other directors in her hospi-
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Amendment applies only to sex-based wage differentials, such an
interpretation appears to provide women with less of a remedy

than is accorded to blacks and other protected classes

13-a

result

contrary to the legislative history behind the addition of sex as a
protected category to Title VI1.114 Moreover, the narrow applica-

tal because of her sex. The district court would not accept such proof but noted:
[I1f the plaintiff in this case alleged and proved that Temple consistently paid
its male employees the salaries prevailing in the area for persons in comparable positions, but consistently paid its female employees salaries lower
than those prevailing in the area for persons in comparable positions, liability under § 1983 might be established. Information concerning the salaries
paid at other institutions would, of course, be relevant under such a theory.
Id. at 451 n.I.
113. A determination that the Bennett Amendment permits disparate treatment
betveen employees for sex-related reasons (where "authorized" by the EPA) would
result in different interpretations of Title VII for different protected groups.
114. Except as specifically limited, such as the bona fide occupational qualification defense, Title ViI's prohibition against sex discrimination is co-extensive with
its prohibition against other forms of discrimination (race, religion, and national origin). See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977), in which the Supreme
Court required that the "adverse effect" test of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), be applied to standards which had exclusionary effects on women as it is
to those affecting blacks. Cf. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978) ("a statute that was designed to make race irrelevant in the employment market . . . could not reasonably be construed to permit a
take-home-pay differential based on a racial classification") (footnote omitted);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (with Title VII "Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in
employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or
national origin") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The Congressmen who were faced with the Civil Rights Act and the impact of
the inclusion of "sex" in the bill were not apprised of any intended different application of the bill's provisions among any of the protected groups. An interpretive memorandum submitted by Senators Clark and Case, the bill's floor managers, provided
that: "To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or
favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited
by section 704 are those which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin." 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (emphasis
added).
Two Northern District of California court cases recognized that different degrees
of protection are granted to women and blacks under the wage-discrimination provisions of Title VII. Smith v. Union Oil Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 960 (N.D.
Cal. 1977); Patterson v. Western Dev. Laboratories, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
772 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In both instances, the court chose to coordinate treatment and
narrow the utility of Title VII in addressing compensation claims involving Negro
male employees by holding the EPA's "equal work" standard as controlling. This
court incorrectly resolved the problem of whether the Bennett Amendment, which
has no direct impact on any protected classification other than sex, limits the scope
of Title VII in wage discrimination claims for other protected groups. While the
California district court appropriately followed the Title VII mandate that no pro-
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tion of Title VII contravenes the principle of providing aggrieved
individuals with an additional remedy to combat invidious discrimination in employment. 1 15
Although policy factors suggest that Title VII should provide a
wider spectrum of compensation-discrimination protection, only

the Ninth1 16 and Third"1 7 Circuits have analyzed the meaning and
purpose of the Bennett Amendment and Title VII to determine
whether congressional intent supported such a broad construction.
The Tenth Circuit 18 has also recognized a Title VII wage-discrimination claim where the defendant had claimed preclusion

under the EPA, but the court did not review the legislative history
or the pertinent case law in arriving at its conclusion.

Gunther: Giving Clout to Title VII.-The first case to categorically analyze and articulate the proper application of the EPA's

"equal work" requirement to Title VII compensation claims in light

of the Bennett Amendment was Gunther v. County of Washington. 119 Gunther was a Title VII wage-discrimination suit
brought by female jail matrons who alleged, inter alia, that they

were discriminatorily paid less than male corrections officers for
work which was "substantially equal.'

120

Finding that the jobs

were not "substantially equal," the district court dismissed the
wage-discrimination claims. 12 1 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit aftected class would be provided with less protection than any other, a better construction would have been that Title VII is broad enough to cover salary-discrimination
claims for "unequal" jobs, provided that the plaintiff aver sufficient facts to establish
a prima facie case.
115. See, e.g., Great American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S.
366, 391 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 457-59 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
See generally Herbert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to
Eliminating Employment Discrimination,46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449 (1971).
116. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101
S. Ct. 2242 (1981).
117. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 3121 (1981).
118. Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
119. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (1981).
120. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 788 (D. Ore. 1976). The women guarded female
inmates, and the male corrections officers guarded male inmates at a higher rate of
pay.
The plaintiffs did not sue under the EPA because it did not cover public employees as of the date the cause of action arose. The cause of action was dated Jan.
15, 1974, whereas the EPA was not extended to public employees until May 1, 1974.
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 1(a), 88 Stat. 55
(1974), cited in Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d at 886 n.4 .
121. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 791-92. The district court found that the males
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firmed the district court's finding that the jobs were not "substantially equal," 122 but the court further held that the plaintiffs were
not precluded from asserting their other claim against the defendant, "that, even if the work was not substantially equal, the defendants nevertheless violated Title VII if some of the difference in
salary between the plaintiffs and the male guards can be attributed
123
to sex discrimination."
Furthermore, since the Supreme Court has determined that
sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the position of
prison guard, 124 in certain circumstances the segregation of male
and female employees in this position would be lawful. Had the
Gunther court taken a contrary position and ruled that Title VII
cannot reach forms of sex-based wage discrimination which do not
meet the EPA's "equal work" criteria, these women could neither
sue for higher wages, nor could they try to transfer to the higherpaying jobs to escape the alleged discrimination. 125 The Gunther
court selectively discussed portions of the legislative history of the
Bennett Amendment 126 and reasoned that it was designed to settle
the potentially conflicting situation which would arise if the four
affirmative defenses contained in the EPA were not incorporated
into Title VII.127
Gunther implies that plaintiffs may use evidence of wage or
compensation discrimination to assert sex-discrimination claims under Title VII against their employers. Employers are exempt from
Title VII liability in the four affirmative-defense situations set forth
supervised more than ten times as many prisoners per guard as did the females and
that the females devoted much of their time to clerical work, which all agreed was
worth less than guard work.
122. 602 F.2d at 888.
123. Id. at 886. The plaintiff's claim was allowed by the court. Id. at 891.
124. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
125. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1107 n.18 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3121 (1981).
126. The Ninth Circuit examined only the statements of Senators Bennett and
Dirksen, which support a construction of Title VII which is broader than the EPA in
the area of compensation discrimination. See text and discussion of these statements
at text accompanying notes 39 & 42 supra.
127. 602 F.2d at 890. At this point the Ninth Circuit did not analyze other
portions of the legislative history. In its later opinion upon the defendant's motion
for rehearing, the Ninth Circuit further explained the Bennett Amendment's purpose
in the following manner: "The Bennett Amendment. . . serves the purpose of clarifying Congress' intent with respect to the relationship of Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act," and "clarifies the burden of proof in an equal pay case brought under Title
VII." 623 F.2d 1303, 1319 (9th Cir. 1980). At that time the Ninth Circuit also examined other relevant statements made during the consideration of Title VII, which
were found supportive of its earlier conclusion. Id. at 1317-21.
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in the EPA.' 28 The Ninth Circuit did not propose any of the
alternate (non-EPA) modes of adducing compensation discrimination which claimants may utilize to meet their burden of proof under Title VII. Rather, the court defined the appropriate limitations
of Title VII in light of the doctrine of in pari materia.1 29 If the
plaintiff's case consists solely of comparing her work to that of another employee, she will have to show that her job requirements
are "substantially equal" to the similarly situated male in order to
establish a prima facie case (that is, the EPA case).' 30 Thus, where
plaintiffs raise a claim that they are entitled to equal pay, using Title VII as an avenue of relief, the EPA's principles and standards
are still applicable.' 31 Title VII will not permit claims that persons
in job A are entitled to a percentage of the salary received by persons in job B based on mere comparisons of work.
The Tenth Circuit: Another Approach to the Issue?-In
Fitzgeraldv. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 132 the Tenth Circuit upheld the
trial court's decision in favor of a female employee who claimed, inter
alia, that she was discriminatorily underpaid even though she was
unable to assert an EPA claim against her employer. The plaintiff in
Fitzgerald was a former female employee who alleged under Title
VII that while she was employed in various capacities she was sexually discriminated against in the areas of promotion and compensation.' 33 While she worked in the advertising department, the director of the department gave up most of his duties, which she,
although not qualified for the title of director, performed obtaining
neither the position of advertising manager, which she was qualified
13 4
for, nor the salary of her predecessor.
After the district court ruled in plaintiff's favor on both counts,
defendant Sirloin Stockade appealed the case, focusing one of its
contentions on the Bennett Amendment, which defendant claimed
128. 623 F.2d at 1321. See note 55 supra for the argument that the EPA will
still remain a viable remedy even though Title VII reaches a broader range of cases.
129. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
130. 623 F.2d at 1321. See text accompanying notes 173-195 infra for a
discussion of the implications for claimants who would like to use Title VII as their
avenue for relief.
131. Under Title VII, where the employer's compensation structure is invalidated, unrelated jobs may eventually be compensated equally by virtue of a court-

imposed reevaluation of the employer's pay practices. In these cases, however, the
plaintiff's proof must consist of affirmative evidence of some discriminatory employer practice other than a mere comparison ofjobs.
132. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
133. Id. at 948-49.
134. Id. at 949.
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mandates that Title VII wage-discrimination claims are controlled
by the EPA. According to Sirloin Stockade, since the plaintiff conceded that she did not perform the same work as the advertising
director, there could be no finding of wage discrimination.' 35
The Tenth Circuit held that the employer's ability to appeal
the charge of wage discrimination depended upon "whether discrimination with regard to compensation which is outside the purview of the Equal Pay Act could violate Title VII.' 36 As to this issue, the court concluded:
This is not a case in which a discriminatory activity is specifically
sanctioned under the Equal Pay Act exceptions and liability is,
nonetheless sought under Title VII. Here, a finding of discrimination under Title VII does not conflict with the provisions of
the Equal Pay Act. It was found that the plaintiff was discriminated against solely because of her sex in a manner which is not
37
within the scope of the Equal Pay Act.'
The court awarded the plaintiff relief calculated to constitute the
difference between the salary she was receiving and that to which
she was entitled based on the actual work she was performing.' 38
Fitzgerald lacks both a discussion of the relevant statutory history and a differentiation between this case and those cases that
have held otherwise. Nonetheless, the case is important because it
focuses on the issue of whether there can be a Title VII case when
the employer is blatantly discriminating against female employees
in a manner not within the scope of the EPA affirmative defenses.
The court answers this question in the affirmative: So long as the
matter is not within the scope of the EPA and does not offend EPA
standards or policy, the Bennett Amendment will not bar such a
claim. 139

IUE v. Westinghouse: FurtherSupport for Title VII Claimants.
-After tackling the brief legislative history of the Bennett Amendment, subsequent administrative interpretations, and the judicial
treatment of Title VII and the EPA, the Third Circuit reached a
conclusion similar to that of the Gunther court and ruled that even
135. Id. at 950-51.
136. Id. at 953 n.2.
137. Id. at 953-54 n.2.
138. Id. at 955-56.
139. In addition, the reasoning in Fitzgerald limits the Tenth Circuit's prior
holding in Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980), to the factual circumstances of the case which evidenced that the plaintiffs failed to show that the wage disparity was the result of unlawful discrimination. See discussion of Lemons at note 108 supra.
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though they could not meet the requirements of the EPA, the female workers at the Westinghouse plant in Trenton, New Jersey,
could sue their employer over an allegedly discriminatory compensation plan that set pay scales on the basis of sex.1 40 Although the
Third Circuit's holding is desirable, the IUE court did not necessarily use the best reasoning to support its outcome.
According to the appellants, 14 1 the Westinghouse rate structure intentionally compensated women at a rate below their estab-

lished value to the company, since the company's compensation
system evolved from a plan which specifically stated that wage

rates should be set lower for incumbents in predominately female
job classifications. 142 The women contended that the salary increases they received over time did not eradicate the wage inequities embodied in Westinghouse's wage structure because wage increases were applied to existing rates on a cents-per-hour or on a

percentage basis.1 43 The trial court held that even if the wage scale
had been set in the intentionally discriminatory manner alleged by
140. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 1321 (1981). Although the Third Circuit analyzed the case as a
wage-discrimination claim, its conclusion is worded in terms of a discriminatory classification scheme: "Because we hold that this alleged intentional discrimination in
formulating classifications of jobs violates Title VII, we will reverse." 631 F.2d at
1097. This phraseology referring to unlawful "classification" is also visible where the
Third Circuit discusses Title VII's protection against discrimination in compensation
on religious grounds. See id. at 1100. This should not deter future courts from using
this opinion as precedent. The basis of liability under Title VII is that the employer
allegedly used a compensation system which sets wage rates lower for femaleintensive classifications. Thus, the issue is really whether this employer practice of
paying less for certain classifications is unlawful.
141. The appellants (plaintiffs in the district court opinion) consisted of a class
of female employees, both unionized and nonunionized, who worked at Westinghouse's Trenton plant. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 451 (D.N.J. 1979).
142. Brief for Appellant at 4-11, IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d
1094 (3d Cir. 1980). The female employees and their union claimed that the employer's present wage structure subsumed the discriminatory wage policy that the company's Industrial Relations Manual evidenced was in practice in the 1930's. Although job evaluation and a point-assigned value to each job based on various
job-related factors were used, the sheet which set forth the hourly wage for jobs at
each labor grade was segregated by sex. The manual specifically instructed plant officials to compensate women's jobs at a lower rate than men's jobs that had received
the same point rating. In 1965, the company established its present compensation
plan by merging the two key sheets, increasing the number of grades, and generally
affording women's jobs labor grades that were below those of male jobs that had
been at a corresponding labor-grade level prior to the merger. Id; see 631 F.2d at
1096-97.
143. Brief for Appellant at 10, IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094
(3d Cir. 1980).
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the plaintiffs, Title VII had not been violated, since the Bennett
Amendment "authorizes" wage differentials that do not violate the
EPA. 14 4 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, carefully analyzing
the phrase in the5 Bennett Amendment "if such differentiation is
14
authorized by."
The two-judge majority opinion began its inquiry with the lan-

guage of the Bennett Amendment which was held to support, by
the plain language alone, IUE's interpretation that only the four
wage differentials expressly permitted by the EPA are incorporated
into Title VII. 146 The ensuing discussion confused various canons of
statutory construction. In interpreting the language of the Bennett
Amendment, the court declared that the doctrine of in pari
materia shall not be applicable, 14 7 yet it reached the same result
regarding the scope of Title VII as if it had utilized such principles. 148 The majority merely refused to include the substantive
scope of the EPA (the "equal work" requirement) as an inherent
limitation on all Title VII wage-discrimination claims-a result not
necessarily in opposition to the in pari materia doctrine.

144. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979).
145. 631 F.2d at 1099.
146. The majority uses the common meaning of the word "authorized" to describe a thing as endorsed or expressly permitted rather than something permitted to
be done in the future. 631 F.2d at 1100-01. As Judge Van Dusen points out in his
dissenting opinion, however, the common meaning of the word is not clear enough
to reveal conclusively the correct interpretation of the Bennett Amendment. Id. at
1111 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1101. The majority declined to apply the in pari materia canon,
since it found other statutory principles supporting its interpretation against applying

the "equal work" standard to Title VII for all wage-discrimination claims. The court
emphasized the principle that "remedies for employment discrimination 'supplement' each other and should not be construed so as to ignore the differences
among them." Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 n.9
(1974)). The court also relied on the principle that "'where a statute with respect to
one subject contains a specific provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute is significant to show a different intention existed.' " Id. (quoting
Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 928 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting General Elec. Co. v.
Southern Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 138 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967))).
148. It is interesting to note that had the court failed to apply a statutory interpretation that harmonizes the two pieces of legislation in the overlapping area of sexbased wage discrimination, the court would have acted erroneously. By refusing to
accord such an interpretation to the statutes, the majority would be intimating that
plaintiffs may be able to base a Title VII wage-discrimination claim for equal pay on
mere comparisons of work of totally unrelated content-a construction explicitly rejected by Congress. See note 30 supra. This interpretation is also contrary to the
raison d'etre of the Bennett Amendment-to prevent the nullification of the EPA.
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Gunther enunciated the seemingly proper interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment and the types of permissible Title VII law-

suits. 149 Although the IUE majority probably reached the same

conclusion, perhaps in its analysis it hastily disavowed the canon
harmonizing the two statutes for fear of an automatic substantive
bar to any causes of action broader than those addressed by the
EPA. In view of the plaintiffs' allegations that the employer's salary
handbook contains an express statement of intentional discrimina-

tion, the plaintiffs are within the realm of cases protected by Title
VII even under Gunther's guidelines.
The IUE majority was not totally convincing in its argument

that the plain words of the Bennett Amendment, its legislative history, and the regulations promulgated relating thereto totally support the construction of the statute implying that, in addition to
EPA claims, a plaintiff can assert other causes of action relating to
wage discrimination under Title VII. Because of the lack of clarity

and guidance provided by Congress, it is difficult to accord any one
interpretation of the interrelationship between Title VII and the
EPA. Indeed, nothing in the language of the Bennett Amendment
or its legislative history indicates to what extent Congress intended
to make the EPA and Title VII coterminous in wage-discrimination
cases. The only certainties in the legislative history of Title VII and
its Bennett Amendment are policy-based premises: The EPA is not

to be nullified, 150 and Title VII is to provide broad remedial relief.151
The Gunther, Fitzgerald, and IUE courts, however, reached
149. See text accompanying notes 128-131 supra.
150. See notes 40, 41 & 47 supra.
151. See notes 6, 33 & 35 supra. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to grant
strong enforcement powers to the Department of Labor and extended the protections
afforded to public employment. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2 000e to e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
Because there were no substantive changes, the broad interpretations of Title
VII applied by courts have been seen as intended by the Congress that enacted the
original bill. As for some of the judicial interpretations of Title VII, it appears that
even though Title VII contains exceptions whereby Congress intended to limit the
scope of the Act's coverage, Title VII has been applied to severely limit the availability of such defenses. Even though a bona fide seniority system is an exception,
the Supreme Court has required changes to put minorities in their "rightful place" at
the expense of other workers. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
764 n.2 (1976). Similarly, the use of professionally developed tests must meet various
standards of validation. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-36 (1971).
See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 CEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 846-84 (1972).
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the result most consistent with Title VII's underlying purpose of
providing a strong weapon against all forms of employment discrimination. 1 52 Regardless of job equality, if the employer's subjectivity is manifestly causing an unreasonably lower take-home wage
for female employees than for male employees, Title VII should be
the means for challenging these wage disparities.
Although the legislative history is not dispositive of the issue,
various policies underlying the usefulness of Title VII as a remedy
to end discrimination should compel courts to reach the conclusion
that Title VII can afford protection to claimants who seek to prove
compensation discrimination and are unable to utilize the EPA.
These policies include the use of Title VII as a means to combat
discrimination, 153 as an additional remedy for employment discrimination, 154 and as a means for women to assert their rights on an
equal basis with other protected classes. 1 5 5 These underlying policies are apparent throughout IUE, Fitzgerald, and Gunther, and
are most obvious in the closing lines of the Third Circuit's opinion
in IUE:
It vould be ironic indeed if the Equal Pay Act, a law triggered
by a Nation's concern over centuries of sexual discrimination and
intended to improve the lot of those vho had been excluded
from the American dream for so long were to lead to the contraction of their rights under Title VII. 56
IN THE AFRERMATH, WHAT IS A TITLE VII
WAGE-DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT?

This section explores examples of the types of Title VII causes
of action which may be asserted, some of the factors courts should
consider, and some of the problems courts will face in handling Title VII wage-discrimination claims. In order to understand the
wage-discrimination cause of action, it is necessary to provide a
brief background of Title VII causes of action in general as well as
the management technique of evaluating and formulating wage
rates and salary structures.
The Title VII Cause of Action
A Title VII claimant may advance either of two theories of discrimination. The disparate-treatment theory enables the plaintiff to
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See note 114 supra.
Id. See generally authority cited note 146 supra.
See cases cited note 115 supra.
See discussion in note 114 supra.
IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d at 1107 (footnote omitted).
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allege that she has been treated differently by virtue of her sex.
The disparate-impact theory, a judicial creation, 157 prohibits employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but which actually fall more harshly on one group
15
than on another.

8

The Title VII cause of action is basically a three-step process.
The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination
before the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's
evidence or else to justify his treatment.159 If the defendant then
meets that burden, the plaintiff can succeed only by showing that
160
this justification is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Basic Frameworkfor Setting Wage Rates

Employers set wage rates through job-evaluation systems.' 6 '
Although there are basically four types of job-evaluation sys157. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). The Court stated:

"[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." The Court also observed that
"Congress directed the thrust of [Title VIIJ to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. (emphasis in original).
158. The distinction between disparate-treatment and disparate-impact cases is
best described by the Supreme Court in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977):
"Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most
easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proofof discriminatorymotive is critical, although it can
in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.... Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "disparate impact." The latter involves employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity .... Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required
under a disparative impact theory.
Id. at 335-36 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
159. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Although McDonnell
Douglas established a four-part test for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in individual cases involving hiring, the Court stated that proving discrimination
could not be restricted to one method: "The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII
cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent
is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U.S.
at 802 n.13.
160. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
161.

W. GLUECK, PERSONNEL: A DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH 408 (1974). "Job eval-

uation is the formal process by which the relative worth of various jobs in the organi-
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tems, 16 2 their methodology is similar. The first step usually entails
an analysis of the tasks that comprise each job, based on a combination of observation of the work performed, interviews with or
questionnaires filled out by job incumbents, and interviews with
supervisors. 16 3 From the job analysis, job descriptions are developed, providing an inventory of the demands and contributions of
the job. 16 4 Jobs are then grouped into related families so that they
can be rated on an appropriate job-evaluation system. 1 65 Based on

zation is determined for pay purposes. Essentially it attempts to relate the amount of

the employee's pay to the size of his job's contribution to organizational effectiveness." Id.
162. There are four basic types of job evaluation plans, each allowing for a substantial amount of subjectivity:
1. Job ranking-This method, usually used in small firms, involves merely
subjectively ranking all the jobs in the firm by order of importance or difficulty. See LAB. REL. REP., LAB., REL. ExP. (BNA) 911, § 12 [hereinafter
cited as LAB. REL. ExP.]; NAS Report, supra note 18, at 2.
2. Job classification-In this system, a series of job levels or grades is predetermined, with categories delineated based on various job factors and
each job is classified or "slotted" into what the evaluators consider to be
the proper relative grade. See LAB. REL. Exp., supra; NAS Report, supra
note 18, at 3.
The last two systems do not consider the job as a whole, but measure each of its
components: The relative worth of the job is determined by the combination of the
values assigned to each of its components. See LAB. REL. ExP., supra.
3. Factor comparison-This system uses a comparison scale consisting of the
basic factors ("compensable factors") of a group of key jobs ("benchmark
jobs") whose existing wage rates, relative worth, and relative importance
of the factors determining worth are agreed upon by the evaluators. The
key jobs are ranked on each factor in order of value of that factor to provide the comparison scale. Other jobs are then ranked on each factor for
comparison to the benchmark jobs. The scores are added to create a total
score for each job, and the jobs are then ranked. See LAB. REL. ExP., supra; NAS Report, supra note 18, at 3.
4. Point system-In this evaluation system a set of compensable factors is
chosen and for each factor, a scale is devised to represent increasing levels of worth. Points are scored on each factor, following the guidance of
examples which are usually provided to show the definition of each degree of each factor. All points are totalled to get the job's worth in relation to the point total of other jobs. See LAB. REL. ExP., supra.

163. See [1979] 1 EEO Compl. Man. (P-H) 40,057.
40,060-62.
164. See id.
165. Often several evaluation systems are used by an employer to cover different categories of jobs, i.e., a plan for exempt administrative positions, a "shop" plan,
and a non-exempt clerical plan. See NAS Report, supra note 18, at 6, 153-54. Separate systems are used because the "compensable factors" vary between types ofjobs.
Id. at 153. Additionally, "the only way to create a job hierarchy which conforms to
external wage hierarchies and enhances internal equity is to restrict questions of internal equity to those subsets of jobs that can be said to fall within the same labor
market." Id. at 154. For instance, a firm might maintain a job evaluation plan for locally recruited non-competetive clerical and technical positions, one for hourly rated
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various "compensable factors" which are visible components of a
job, jobs are then evaluated with respect to their "worth" to the
organization, 1 66 and then hierarchically ranked. 16 7 Finally, using
the results of the job evaluation, wage rates and salary levels are
set up.

Wage-setting is based only partially on the resultant jobevaluation "score" and is usually produced by an amalgam of external factors such as market forces, politics, union influence, and
emotion. 16 8 Unfortunately, job evaluation is not a totally rational

and equitable system for compensating employees because it involves subjective judgments and biases at each step. 16 9 An inherent limitation on the accuracy of job-evaluation systems is that they
are often constructed in a manner that automatically reflects the
current wage structure. 170 If the market contains discriminatory
wage rates, the employer's job-evaluation plan is likely to mirror
the situation. 171 Additionally, employers often use separate jobevaluation plans to cover different categories of jobs. 172 With separate job-evaluation plans, only jobs in the same "family" are compared, precluding comparison of how certain "compensable factors"
are evaluated across sectors in the organization. More to the point,
the "worth" of jobs having totally dissimilar duties and responsibili73
ties cannot be compared.1

positions and another for executive and professional positions recruited nationally.

Id.
166. Since it is difficult to compute the exact worth of a job to an enterprise,
proxies for effectiveness are utilized-"compensable factors." These are components
of the job, i.e., skills required, effort required, amount of responsibility involved, and
working conditions. See W. GLUECK, supra note 161, at 408-09. The basic tenet of
job evaluation is that the system is based on the job and not the incumbent. Id. at
409.
167. See [1979] 1 EEO Compl. Man. (P-H) 40,059.
168. See Remarks of Richard Henderson, EEOC Hearings on Comparable
Worth, excerpted in 1 LAn. REL. REP. (BNA), NEWS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION,
vol. 104, at 29.

169. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 434-41. The room for bias and
subjectivity in job evaluation permits ingrained societal prejudices to be co-opted
into the wage structure if the employer's methodology for compensating his work
force is left immune from challenge. Even with Title VII causes of action, the market
rate may still prove to be a defense for the employer. See cases cited in note 17 supra and note 190 infra.
170. Sometimes the designer of the system judges how much each factor
should contribute to the total worth of the job. Other times the weight to be accorded to each factor is derived empirically through regression analysis. NAS Report,
supra note 18, at 6.
171. Id. at 8, 54-55.
172. See discussion at note 162 supra.
173. NAS Report, supra note 18, at 35, 53-54. See generally Blumrosen, supra
note 3, at 440; Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 3, at 255 n.101.
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Job Evaluation and the Title VII
Wage-DiscriminationCause of Action
Despite all its fallacies, job evaluation remains an important
tool for plaintiffs seeking to establish a prima facie wagediscrimination case under Title VII. By utilizing the employer's
own evaluation system, in which the "worth" of a job has been determined to some extent, plaintiffs can show discrimination in compensation across dissimilar jobs (limited by the range of jobs in the
plan's coverage) without involving courts in entirely subjective
wage-setting. Rather than rest their case on mere comparisons of
job content in the abstract, 174 claimants will be analyzing how the
employer's wage structure was formulated. Since Title VII bars
employer practices that are based on the intent to discriminate or
have the effect of discriminating against women, some of the subjectivity underlying an employer's salary structure can now be
disputed.
Analyzing the manner in which values are assigned to "compensable factors" may reflect discrimination. The job evaluation's
emphasis should be on duties that are usually performed, and
credit should be given to the qualifications needed for an employee
to perform tasks that reflect the actual job content. The job analyst,
however, may emphasize certain duties to ensure that one job receives a higher rate of pay while minimizing or even neglecting
certain job tasks performed by another (that is, skills involved in
traditionally female jobs), resulting in a lower "rank" and less pay
for women. That courts are able to ascertain whether the choice of
"compensable factors" in an employer's job-evaluation plan skews
the rank of "female" jobs to the female employee's detriment is
75
illustrated by Thompson v. Boyle. 1
Thompson v. Boyle, brought under the EPA, dealt with male
bookbinder and female journeyman bindery worker (JBW) positions
at the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO). The testimony of
the defendant's job evaluator revealed that he assigned higher
point scores to "male" jobs for lifting certain materials which were
comparable in weight to those lifted by women (48 points for
174. These types of cases must meet the substantive prerequisites of the EPA
because neither Title VII nor the EPA will permit statutory violations to be estab-

lished solely on comparisons of the relative value of job content between two sufficiently dissimilar jobs. See text accompanying notes 29-32 & 129-131 supra.
175. 24 Wage and Hour Cas. 744 (D.D.C. 1980). The plaintiffs in Thompson v.
Boyle established an EPA violation. The case is useful, regardless of the statutory
foundation utilized, to demonstrate that the compensation discrimination Title VII
can address may often be ostensibly clear.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 5 [1981], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1575

men" vs. 12 points for "women"), and higher point scores to
"male" employees for the handling of confidential data, giving none
to "women" who handled the same material. 17 6 The defendant's
job evaluator also underestimated the experience and skill factors
in JBW work, ignored training requirements, and awarded no
points for training or experience in sewing because "the sewing
was of the variety most women knew how to perform."' 7 7 Where
the jobs are not equal, Title VII now appears, on the basis of Gunther, Fitzgerald, and IUE, to protect employees whose wages are
set based on evaluations resulting in discriminatory treatment if
that treatment is the cause of lower wages for jobs filled mostly by
one sex as opposed to the other.
Where an employer divides his employees into groups for
evaluation purposes, the assignment itself may be improper under
Title VII. Through econometric analysis-a quantitative technique
using mathematical models to represent an employer's behavior on
the whole-it can be estimated whether the employee's sex had
any effect on the compensation received. 178 For instance, where
traditionally female jobs are in the "clerical group" and a similarly
titled male job (such as "cleaner") is evaluated by a different evaluation plan ("males" receiving more pay), the wage disparity may be
discriminatory. Another example of improper separation of "male"
employees from "female" employees is the IUE dual-wageclassification issue. 179 Assume an employer evaluates both "male"
and "female" jobs by one evaluation system (which means that the
jobs will probably be somewhat related) and these jobs "score" on
the same level. If the employer then separates the "female" scores
from the "male" scores and pays them less, a court should find
that the plaintiff has met her burden of showing discriminatory intent. 180
Although an existing EPA regulation states that equal point
value does not by itself mean the jobs at issue are "equal,"' 181 this
176. Id. at 751.

177. Id.
178. For an informative explanation of the principles of econometrics and its
application to wage-discrimination cases, see Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal
Proceedings,80 COLUM. L. REv. 702 (1980).
179. See note 142 supra for a discussion of plaintiff's allegations in the IUE
case.
180. This would comport with the typical Title VII paradigm for intentional
discrimination. See text accompanying notes 157-160 supra.
181. 29 C.F.R. § 800.121 (1979); see Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F.
Supp. 257, 260 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (fact that jobs performed by male and female employees may have same total point value under evaluation system in use by em-
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regulation refers to the threshold determination of whether the
jobs are "equal" and is silent regarding the employer's intent. If interpreted otherwise, this regulation would be inconsistent with the
182
congressional purpose of eliminating intentional discrimination.
If there are legitimate reasons for the wage disparity, the employer
can assert them on his rebuttal.' 83 This type of Title VII claim is
likely to be used frequently because prior to the enactment of the
EPA and Title VII, separate wage schemes were permissible and
18 4
often encouraged.
A disparate-impact theory may also be borne out if the plaintiff
can show that a facially neutral practice, such as the choice of compensable factors, results in an increased wage rate for jobs held
mostly by males. Unless the factors chosen accurately reflect the
features of the job, the rank will not be an accurate representation
of the organizational structure. For example, in Thompson v.
Boyle, the court noted that the job-evaluation system used had
not been adapted for use at the GPO bindery and that certain
aspects of the plan were irrelevant to the tasks performed at the
GPO.' 8 5 Additionally, the Seattle office of the EEOC had rejected
the plan on the ground of built-in sex bias because it did not grant
points for physical effort for repetitive operations with light objects,
which might have added points to the evaluations of "female"
jobs.' 8 6 To rebut this disparate-impact charge, an employer can
show that use of the particular plan is based on business necessity
and that there is no better way to evaluate all of his or her organi87
zation's jobs.1

If the employee is performing a unique job, discrimination can
88
be demonstrated as it was in Fitzgeraldv. Sirloin Stockade, Inc.1
By examining the job tasks performed and the salary by a predecessor or successor, a court may conclude that a proportion of this
salary was unfairly denied to the claimant. If the employer usually
ployer does not in itself mean that jobs concerned are equal according to terms of
EPA).
182. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). The Court stated: "In order
for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be consistent with the
congressional purpose." Id. at 237.
183. For a discussion of the classic three-step Title VII paradigm, see text accompanying notes 159-160 supra.

184. See Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 443 & n.109.
185.
186.
187.
188.

24 Wage and Hour Cas. at 750.
Id.
See authority cited in note 10 supra.
624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
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pays "the market rate," by comparing the salary in this unique job
to that received by a similarly situated male incumbent in a nearby
organization, a claimant not only establishes the existence of discrimination, but simultaneously demonstrates the amount of back
pay deserved as relief.
Of course, under Title VII each case will present its own fac-

tual determination as to whether the evidence points to discrimination. Courts should hesitate to substitute their judgment for the
judgment of those possessing expertise in the area, but only where
the wage structure appears rational and thoroughly considered. 8 9

An apparent limitation on an employer's liability and an affirmative defense available to employers under Title VII is the current
market rate.190 If the employer pays higher wages to certain work-

ers because higher wages are paid for such work in the local labor
market, the difference in wages is legitimate. Thus, the degree of

change that Title VII will actually have on wage rates for males
and females who are not performing "equal" work is questionable.

Plaintiffs will certainly be able to refute the relevance of the labor
market on which the employer-defendant patterns his wages. 191

In these Title VII claims, courts will of necessity be using the
tabooed "comparable work" evidence as a supplementary aid to
their scrutiny of whether the employer's compensation practices
discriminate by sex. This poses the question of whether such an
189. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Armco Steel Corp., 24 Wage and Hour Cas. 651 (S.D.
Tex. 1979), for a situation where the court deferred to managerial discretion where it
seemed legitimate.
190. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977), where the
court stated:
The value of the job to the employer represents but one factor affecting
wages. Other factors may include the supply of workers willing to do the job
and the ability of the workers to band together to bargain collectively for
higher wages. We find nothing in the text and history of Title VII suggesting
that Congress intended to abrogate the laws of supply and demand or other
economic principles that determine wage rates for various kinds of work. We
do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in
setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications.
Id. at 356.
191. For instance, the wages surveyed should reflect similar skills, experience,
and seniority to the extent data are available.
An interesting issue will be whether this defense will apply to those companies
that actually create the market rate. Intra-industry wage standardization has grown
through the years, especially with the influx of multi-employer bargaining, trade associations, and union interest in a standard wage. Where industry standards are accepted, often some company or companies assume the position as pace-setter, e.g.,
U.S. Steel in the steel industry. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 224-27 (2d
ed. N. Chamberlain & J. Kuhn 1965).
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application contravenes the intent of Congress to avoid ascertaining
the worth of "comparable work." 192 As the dissenting judge in the
IUE case noted, even where there is an alleged express policy of
discrimination that has been perpetuated since 1939, only
through the evidence of the worth of "comparable work" can the
appellants prove that this policy still exists.19 3
A forceful argument can be made that the equal-work comparison apparently contemplated by the EPA is only an evidentiary device to determine if pay is unreasonably low in a job that merits
equal pay. 194 In the Title VII cause of action, jobs are not being
compared. It is the employer's compensation practices that are
challenged. No one is telling the employer how much to pay any
group of employees, but only that he must apply the same principles to all on a nondiscriminatory basis. This may, however, only
be a distinction without a difference. Title VII will permit judicial
inspection of the employer's pay practices, and this may involve
questioning the fundamental evaluations of the employer's jobs,
that is, how he determined their "worth." In certain situations, the
policy behind an employer's salary schedule may suffice on its own
to establish a prima facie case, 195 such as where the employer pays
10% above the market rate to all jobs except those mainly occupied
by women, or where the employer uses one pay formula for one
legitimately sexually segregated group of employees and a higherpaying one for the other. But even in these simpler cases, disagreement is sure to arise as to the proper compensation to be
196
awarded as a remedy.

192. See discussion in note 30 supra.
193. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1108 (3d Cir. 1980) (Van
Dusen, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 3121 (1981).
194. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 28-31, IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 3121 (1981).
195. See, e.g., Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380
(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976) (employer used different formulas
for calculating wages for female employees and male employees).
196. Beyond the scope of this Note is the issue of damages. As an aside, courts
should take note that equitable remedies are rather difficult to provide. Nevertheless, it would be a perversion of justice to permit a wrongdoer to be relieved from
the duty to make reparations because the amount of damages is unascertainable. See
Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1931).
Reasonable inferences of the extent of damages can provide a basis for the recovery awarded. At least one sex-discrimination case has applied this classic tort
treatment of the damages issue to provide a back-pay award even though the amount
of damages was indefinite. See Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939, 943-44
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). The Meadows court also relied on
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While it may be difficult to analyze the employer's compensa-

tion structure and impose damage awards that guarantee accurate
and adequate relief for all parties concerned, judicial flexibility is
accepted as inevitable in the discrimination area. Rather than shy
away from determining if pay is unreasonably low because of sex-

based discrimination, courts should welcome the challenge and
conform to the mandate of Title VII to rid the employment environment of discrimination.
CONCLUSION

In affirming Gunther v. County of Washington, 19 7 the United
States Supreme Court accepted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of the Bennett Amendment as not precluding a Title VII sex-based
wage-discrimination claim. As a result, a plaintiff who cannot frame
a cause of action within the ambit of the EPA but has reasonable
grounds for believing that her wages or compensation rate may be
based on impermissible sexual factors can bring a Title VII sex-

based wage-discrimination claim as long as the wage rate is not exempted under the EPA's affirmative defenses.
The recognition that the EPA is not an appropriate remedy for
the more subtle and sophisticated types of wage discrimination, for
it can address only situations where jobs are "substantially equal,"
provided the impetus for the Ninth,' 9 8 Tenth, 19 9 and Third2 °° Cirthe legislative history of the provisions authorizing back-pay relief (42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). Id. at 942-43. The legislative history states:
'The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide discretion in
exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible." 118
CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (Conference Report). Without back-pay awards available,
employers would know that the worst that might happen is that they would be enjoined from such practices.

Appellants in IUE suggested several possible ways to determine damages. Trials
can be bifurcated to maintain judicial sanctity and efficiency, with liability first established and relief considered in a second stage. This two-part or bifurcated trial is
outlined in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). After a violation has
been found by the factfinder (aided in its determination by job evaluators), remedial
proceedings could be handled as follows: Appoint a Special Master; order the defendant to prepare and submit a compensation system that does not take into account
the impermissible factor of sex (proceedings then would be limited to the litigation
of objections to the plan); and/or allow the parties to mutually agree upon a remedy.
See Appellant's Reply Brief at 26, IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094
(3d Cir. 1980).
197. 101 S.Ct. 2242 (1981), aff'g Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d
882 (9th Cir. 1979).
198. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101
S. Ct. 2242 (1981).
199. Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
200. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 1321 (1981).
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cuits to clarify the construction to be given to the EPA and Title
VII. Although the Supreme Court, in affirming Gunther, left
unresolved such questions as the formulation of remedies, the sufficiency of plaintiff's claims, and the availability of the market rate as
a complete defense for an employer, it is now settled that Title VII
can redress the intricate and complicated forms of discrimination
that may be hidden within an employer's wage-setting and compensation machinery.
Lisa Levine Shapiro
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